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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Under the technical direction of the Combat Damage Assess-
ment Committee (CDAC) , the Combat Damage Assessment Team (CDAT)
conducted firings of the A-10/GAU-8 weapon system against an
array of 10 tanks simulating a Soviet tank company deployed for
an attack. The CDAT used M-47 tanks stowed with main gun ammuni-
tion, diesel fuel, lubricating oil, and crew mannikins to simulate
the Soviet tanks. The pilots of the two A-10 aircraft used in
the firings conducted their firings at low altitudes and low dive
angles which simulated attack below the altitude of effective
engagement for opposing air defense networks employing acquisition
and fire control radar. The purpose of the test was to evaluate
the effects of the 30mm API antitank ammunition of the GAU-8 gun
under challenging conditions of engagement for the A-10/GAU-8
system against realistically simulated Soviet tank formations.
The Combat Damage Assessment Committee assessed the results
of the low angle cannon firings of the two A-10 aircraft against
the simulated Soviet tank company as follows:
1. Attack Parameters
:
The pilots of the A-10 aircraft
attacked the simulated Soviet tank company for 10 minutes 30 se-
conds at low altitude and dive angles. The pilots made a total
of 23 passes each at a primary tank target. The passes resulted
in projectile impacts on 23 primary, ten secondary, and 5 inci-
dental target tanks, i.e., the pilots impacted every primary tar-
get and in addition inflicted damage 18 times each on secondary
and incidental tank targets near the primary. The attack open
fire dive angles averaged 7.1° during 23 passes against the tar-
gets. Open fire slant ranges averaged 2759 feet and cease fire
slant ranges 2078 feet. The pilots fired 1969 rounds in 23
bursts averaging 86 rounds and 1.3 seconds each.
2. Weapon Effects : The A-10/GAU-8 weapon system achieved
347 impacts on the ten tank targets. The ratio of impacts to
total rounds fired was a substantial 0.18. The weapons system
achieved 50 perforations of the armored envelopes of the tanks
with a ratio of perforations to impacts of 0.14. Many projectiles,
which did not perforate armor, severely damaged exterior track
and suspension components of the tanks as well as command and con-
trol optical devices and gun tubes.
3. Damage Assessment : The attacking A-10/GAU-8 weapon sys-
tems inflicted six catastrophic kills on tanks in the company
array. Three additional tanks in the array did not explode or
burn but were severely damaged within the time frame of the aerial
attack and rendered incapable of both fire and movement. One
final tank in the array suffered only moderate damage; it remained
capable of firing but was reduced in its ability to maneuver. As
a formation, the simulated Soviet tank company was for any practi-
cal purpose destroyed.
4. Test Conditions : The target tanks were sited in open,
flat desert terrain with no cover and little concealment, Aerial
weather conditions were ones of unlimited ceiling and visibility.
Shortly after the initial firing passes black smoke from burn-
ing and exploding tanks and clouds of white dust from projectile
impacts were evident. Such conditions effectively simulated the
actual obscuration which would have been presented to the pilots
in combat and reduced their effectiveness in several firing passes
as evidenced by in-flight voice recordings of the mission.
5. Summary and Conclusions : Under contrasting firing condi-
tions of ideal weather and open, flat terrain but challenging low
altitude attack parameters and battlefield smoke and dust obscura-
tion, the A-10/GAU-8 weapon system knocked out nine of ten tanks
in the simulated Soviet tank company. The term, knocked out, com-
prises the following conditions: six tanks suffered internal ex-
plosions and fires and three additional tanks were immobilized and
simultaneously rendered incapable of firing their main armament.
The observed and documented results support the conclusion that:
a. The A-10/GAU-8 weapon system employing 30mm API projec-
tiles has the accuracy and lethality to destroy M-47 and similarly
protected tanks, e.g., Soviet T-55 and T-62 tanks, under realistic
firing conditions.
b. GAU-8 30mm API projectiles fired in realistic low level
passes by A-10 aircraft can perforate the sides and rear of main
battle tanks and cause catastrophic damage through explosion of
tank ammunition and ignition of fuel and oil.
c. GAU-8 30mm API projectiles which do not perforate the
armor of main battle tanks have the capability to immobilize
them through damage to exterior track, suspension, and drive com-
ponents .
d. From the viewpoint of GAU-8 3 0mm API ammunition effects
and resulting damage to combat stowed main battle tanks, the tac-
tic of low level attack was shown in this firing test to be a
successful one.
6. The overall results of the test are summarized in the
accompanying Table I.
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Since February 19 78, the Armament Directorate, A-10
System Program Office, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio,
has conducted firing tests using the A-10/GAU-8 system in low
level, air-to-ground engagements of armored targets. The tests
have been conducted within the framework of the GAU-8 30mm
ammunition Lot Acceptance Verification Program (LAVP) -Airborne.
The LAVP has the following objectives which apply to the present
tests
:
A. To evaluate the performance of existing production
lots of GAU-8 ammunition when fired from the air under
operational conditions
.
B. To evaluate the lethality of GAU-8 ammunition against
armored targets when fired at low level from A-10 air-
craft using operational tactics.
To conduct the LAVP program, the Armament Directorate has
coooperated with Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB
,
Virginia and in turn with the Tactical Fighter Weapons Center,
Nellis AFB, Nevada. Within the framework of that cooperation,
the Armament Directorate has set up a Combat Damage Assessment
Team (CDAT) to plan and execute the firing tests and evaluate
the results. The CDAT functions under the direction of a Combat
Damage Assessment Committee (CDAC) which has prepared this re-
port of the firing test of 15 June 79
.
A-l
II . Test Philosophy
To generate realistic data, the CDAC determined to use a
highly empirical technique of destructive testing of actual
target tanks. Tests have involved firings at individual tanks
in November 19 77 and February - March 19 78, and more recently,
arrays of vehicles in tactical formations. The experimental
setup for the firings of 15 June 78 involved the second use of
a multitarget, tactically arrayed tank formation for attack by
the A-10/GAU-8 system. The CDAC elected to simulate a Soviet
tank company as organized within a tank division as the target
array for two attacking A-10 aircraft. As few constraints as
possible were placed on the attacking pilots in an attempt to
develop as much realism as possible. Figure 1 shows the test
factors which would have been ideal in the test of 15 June 78
and the practicable setup which was achieved.
III. The Simulated Ground Combat Situation
The firing test of 15 June 78 simulated the attack by two
A-10 aircraft on a Soviet tank company. The CDAC hypothesized
the Soviet tank company to be the lead march security detach-
ment for the battalion, which in turn, is the advance guard of
a larger mobile formation. The lead detachment is operating
approximately five kilometers in front of the Soviet battalion
column. The mission of the advance company is to ensure the
uninterrupted advance of the battalion and provide security





Comparison of Ideal & Practicable Test Situations
Ideal
Test Parameters
1. Air Attack Realism 1
a. Actual A-10/GAU-8
b. 30mm APIT
c. European Weather &
Terrain
d. Optimum open fire
ranges (2000 feet)
e. Low altitude attack
( <5° Dive Angle)
2. Air Defense Realism 2
a. Automatic cannon firing
at A/C
b. Missile systems firing
at A/C
c. Small arms firing at A/C
—
d. AD suppression by A/C
3
.
Threat Targets and Doctrine 3
a. T62/T64/T72 high fidelity-
targets
b. Stowed combat loads
(in T-62/T-64/T72)
c. Realistic crew station
postures








c. Nevada desert terrain
and Weather
d. Long open fire ranges
(4000-3000 ft safety
constraints)
e. Low altitude attack
(< 5 P Dive Angle)
Air Defense Realism
a. Low altitude, low angle,
minimum exposure attacks





d. No suppression simulation
in test
Threat Targets and Doctrine
a. Simulated Soviet Tanks
b. Stowed combat loads
(in US M-47)
c. Wooden crew mannikins
d. Static combat formation
e. Stationary targets
A-3
deploys into an appropriate combat formation to reduce the
resistance or form a base of fire for offensive action by the
remainder of the battalion.
A Soviet tank company, which is operating as simulated
in the firing test, would probably have other units attached
to it for its support. Attached units might include any one
or all of the following elements: (1) motorized rifle platoon,
(2) engineer detachment, (3) chemical defense element. The
lead attachment simulated in the firing test consisted of
tanks alone. The pure tank formation was arranged with two
platoons up and one back simulating an assault posture. The
tanks used in the firing test were US M-47 tanks. The tanks
were not maneuvered during the firing test and the formation
was essentially a "snapshot" of the company at a single point
in time (See Figure 2)
.
IV. The Target Tanks
The US M-47 tank was the most effective target available in
sufficient numbers to simulate Soviet T-55 and T-62 tanks. The
US tank is similar in armor protection to the Soviet tanks, and
with the appropriate purging of its gasoline fuel system a simi-
lar target from the viewpoint of stowed fuel. The most signi-
ficant difference in survivability among the vehicles is the
superior protection of the M-47 tank at the rear of the turret
attributable to the extreme overhang and attached stowage box.
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DISCUSSION ; The US M-47 tank was designed with a large overhang at
the rear of the turret and attached heavy gauge steel stowage box.
The combination of box, overhang, and components within the over-
hang of the turret drastically reduces chances of (1) projectiles
perforating the rear of the turret, and (2) perforating projectiles
causing casualties or inpacting stowed ammunition in the fighting
compartment. Soviet T-55 and T-62 tanks do not have overhanging
turrets and are significantly more vulnerable to impacts at the rear
of the turret and resulting catastrophic kills from impacted stowed
ammunition and fuel in the fighting compartment.
Sketch 1. — THE US M-47 TANK: TURRET
OVERHANG AND 180° (REAR) ASPECT
SURVIVABILITY
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armor protection and the arrangement of internal components %
The decision was made, accordingly, to simulate the hetter
known, earlier model Soviet tanks with the readily available
M-4 7 vehicles.
The M-47 tanks used for targets were in excellent condition
from the viewpoint of damage assessment.. The exterior components
were complete and the tanks have proven to be effective targets
for the collection of exterior mobility damage. Interior compo-
nents were less complete in the target tanks » All of the most
essential items were present, e.g., main gun, engine, transmis-
sion, fuel tanks, ammunition racks, etc., but other items such
as oil coolers, range finders, vision devices, and radios, were
not present in all tanks.
The most sensitive internal items from the viewpoint of
catastrophic kills and high percentage M and F kills are the
following, which were placed in the test tanks as noted:
Generic Sensitive Item Test Item
1. /Ammunition US Cartridge, 90mm TP-T
2. Fuel Number 2 Diesel
3. Oil Oil in Engine, Trans-
mission and Drive
Components
4. Personnel Articulated Plywood
Mannikins
The tanks were static during the test and their engines
were not running, with the result that the fuel and oil were
much cooler and more inert than would have been the case with
a static vehicle with its engine running. The kill ratio ach-
ieved in the firing test of 15 June 78, therefore, is probably




V. The Test and Results
The test itself consisted of bringing together the ammuni-
tion, gun, aircraft, pilots, and combat arrayed and loaded tanks
into a several minutes simulation of combat. In essence, the
decisive elements which had been fed into the test immediately
prior to the firing were the following:
1. Honeywell 30mm API ammunition.
2. General Electric GAU-8 Gatling gun.
3. Fairchild Republic A-10 attack aircraft.
4. USAF Fighter Pilots, 422d FWS , Nellis AFB.
5. US M-47 main battle tanks.
The combat simulation itself comprised the aerial fire and
maneuver of the attacking A-10 aircraft. A realistic way of
presenting the combat simulation is to outline the sequence of
pertinent events in each firing pass. The sequence of events
and pertinent data which the CDAT attempted to collect in order
to reconstruct the simulated combat firing of 15 June 79 were
the following:
Sequence Event Data
1. Aircraft Approach Speed, Altitude
2. Aircraft Attack Open Fire Range, Dive Angle
3. Aircraft Attack Burst Time, Rds (R) Fired
4. Aircraft Attack Cease Fire Range, Dive Angle
5. Gun Effects (Accuracy) Impacts (I) on Tanks, (I/R)
6. Gun Effects (Lethality) Perfs (P) Thru Armor, (P/I)
7. Tank Damage Catastrophic Kills
8. Tank Damage Mobility (M) , Firepower (F)
Kills
The data noted immediately above were collected through the
combined efforts of the CDAT and range personnel at Nellis AFB
working together and using TSPI equipment, motion picture and
A-
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still cameras, the industrial efforts required to repair, re-
furbish, and field the tank targets, and various systematic
research techniques used to describe weapon effects and combat
damage. The most basic materiel used in the test - the pro-
jectile, gun, aircraft and targets - are illustrated in Figures
3 through 6. The targets were arrayed in the tactical forma-
tion of a Soviet tank company as shown in Figure 2.
The pilots making the attack worked in a two-ship, mutually
supporting element and employed operational tactics throughout
the test passes. The pilots approached the target area at low
altitude and simulated target acquisition with the help of a
forward air controller. The pilots then pressed in their attacks
on the acquired targets at low altitudes and low dive angles
simulating operations under the altitudes for effective acquisi-
tion and tracking by opposing air defense systems.
The A-10 maneuvering and firing during each pass at a
primary target are presented in terms of basic data such as
speed, dive angle, etc. in the following photographs and accom-
panying tables and figures. Weapon effects, various measures
of effectiveness, e.g., kills per pass, other ratios, etc. and
the resulting damage are noted in other paragraphs, tables,
and photographs in the following section of the report.
Table II presents the test in terms of the A-10 speed
during firing and is based on time, space, position information
(TSPI) and the reading of heads up display (HUD) camera film.










































































the firing passes varying between 578 ft/sec (342 knots) and
499 ft/sec (295 knots) and averaging overall 535 ft/sec (316
knots) . The firing speeds largely in excess of 300 knots
combined with the clean, unencumbered configuration of the air-
craft resulted in exceptional maneuverability of the aircraft
during the attacks on the tank company.
Table TXL presents the test in terms of the A-10 dive angles
during the firing passes. The clearly configured aircraft were
able to attack at low dive angles ranging between 4.4 and 10.8
degrees. The low dive angles resulted in an overwhelming pre-
dominance of impacts against the side surfaces of the hulls and
turrets of the target tanks and relatively low vertical obliqui-
ties. In the test of 15 June 78, the M-47 tanks proved vulner-
able to perforation through the armored side surfaces partly
because of the dive angles and resulting low vertical obliquities
The next illustration, Table IV, shows open fire slant
ranges for pass at a primary target. The attacking pilots opened
fire at medium ranges for the A-10/GAU-8 system averaging 2795
feet. The actual open fire ranges clustered near the statistical
average, and, as medium ranges of engagement they resulted in
effective ratios of accuracy and lethality for the system.
Figure 7 is extracted from an in-flight recording of the
pilots' comments during the firing. The recording shows that the
pilots were faced with realistic battlefield obscuration, specifi-
cally smoke from the fires and explosions within the tanks which
they had catastrophically damaged.
A-14
Figures 8 through 10 are plots of the A-10 attack path
in a vertical plane against targets located at 00 in the dis-
play. The figures define the path of attack immediately
before, during, and after the firing and represent an instant
summary of the more important aircraft attack parameters in-
cluding altitude, firing range, and dive angle (note unequal
scales in feet on x and y axes)
.
Table V shows the burst length and number of rounds
fired during each pass. For aircraft PI, the average burst
length was 1.17 seconds, which was realistically short from
the viewpoint of non-maneuvering exposure to air defense fire,
For the same aircraft, the average number of rounds fired was
77, which was a moderate amount, but one which promised effec-
tive numbers of impacts on targets and perforations through
the armored envelope based on empirical ratios developed dur-
ing testing in the LAVP . For aircraft P2 , similar comments
can be made.
Table VI shows the arrival mode of the projectiles which
impacted the target tanks and the projectile effects in the
cases where the projectiles impacted armor. The table shows
that 90% of the projectiles directly impacted the target
tanks while 10% arrived as ricochets off the ground. The
direct impacts in turn were broken down into 53% which direct-
ly impacted the armor, and 47% which hit exterior components
with varying but largely insignificant results against the
armor.
A-15
Catastrophic damage to tanks largely comprises the ef-
fects of internal fires and explosions. Table VII shows the
development of catastrophic damage in the tanks of the target
array in terms of the observed progress of internal fires.
Tanks 11, 14, and 15, for example, were observed to burn, i.e.,
suffer from major internal fires and/or explosions, within
5.6 minutes of the initial firing pass.
Table VIII summarizes the damage inflicted in the firing
passes and shows six tanks with catastrophic damage, three
tanks with either complete or extremely high degradation of
both mobility and firepower, and one tank with moderate degra-
dation of mobility.
Table IX summarizes the distribution of perforations on
the armored surfaces of the target tanks. It shows the un-
usual fact that 48% of the perforations were thru the turret,
which comprises approximately 3 3% of the presented area.
Partial explanation for the phenomenon is the shielding ef-
fects of the suspension components on tank hulls.
Figure 12 ties together aircraft attack parameters, weapon
effects, and target damage, in effect, summarizing the entire
firing test. The table shows that the pilots/planes/cannons
had the skill/performance/effects to immobilize the MBTs in
38% of the firing passes and catastrophically destroy them
in 26% of the passes. One of the most pressing missions of
the A-10 is to blunt attacking enemy armored spearheads by
physically halting (or slowing) the attacking armor. Halting
enemy armor gives US Army and allied ground forces the
A-16
opportunity (1) to concentrate against deeply penetrating
spearheads, and (2) to destroy more easily the immobilized
or slowed enemy armor. The capability of the A-10 to halt
enemy armor, thus, is at a premium, and the figure shows
a particularly significant capability for immobilizing the
main battle tanks used in the forcing tests to simulate a
























































































































































Table II presents the test in terms of the A-10 speed during firing
and is based on time, space, position information (TSPI) and the reading
of heads up display (HUD) camera film. The table shows the A-10 aircraft
attacking at speeds during the firing passes varying between 578 ft/sec
(342 knots) and 499 ft/sec (295 knots) and averaging overall 535 ft/sec
(316 knots). The firing speeds largely in excess of 300 knots combined
with the clean, unencumbered configuration of the aircraft resulted in
exceptional maneuverability of the aircraft during the attacks on the tank
company.
























































5.3 4.8 HUD PITCH 2.8
4.5 4.5 HUD PITCH 2.8
4.4 4.4 HUD PITCH 2.8
5.7 6.3 TSPI 0.5
5.8 5.8 HUD PITCH 2.8
3.3 4.4 TSPI 0.5
5.6 5.6 HUD PITCH 2.8
3.3 4.4 TSPI 0.5
10.7 10.8 HUD PITCH 2.8
7.8 9.2 TSPI 0.5
6.5 6.5 HUD PITCH 2.8
3.6 4.7 TSPI 0.5
4.6 5.1 HUD PITCH 2.8
8.1 9.0 TSPI 0.5
8.3 8.3 HUD PITCH 2.8
7.4 8.8 T"PI 0.5
7.3 7.4 HUD PITCH 2.8
5.6 6.6 TSPI 0.5
9.5 9.9 HUD PITCH 2.8
6.7 8.4 TSPI 0.5
6.5 6.5 HUD PITCH 2.8
5.9 6.9 TSPI 0.5
Table III presents the test in terms of the A-10 dive angles during
the firing passes." The clearly configured aircraft were able to attack
at low dive angles ranging between 4.4 and 10.8 degrees. The low dive
angles resulted in an overwhelming predominance of impacts against the side
surfaces of the hulls and turrets of the target tanks and relatively low
vertical obliquities. In the test of 15 June 78, the M-47 tanks proved
vulnerable to perforation through the armored side surfaces partly because
of the dive angles and resulting low vertical obliquities.




























































































































4 2401 TSPI 10
Table IV shows open fire slant ranges for pass at a primary target.
The attacking pilots opened fire at medium ranges for the A-10/GAU-8
system averaging 2795 feet. The actual open fire ranges clustered near
the statistical average, and, as medium ranges of engagement they resulted
in effective ratios of accuracy and lethality for the system.
Table IV. — THE RESULTS: AIRCRAFT ATTACK SLANT RANGES
A-20
Pilot 2: All right.
***** (10:40:09 Pilot-1's tenth firing burst.)
Pilot 1: Up on the east. Getting smoky out here.
Pilot 1: Count 240, Bill. Good pass, Jim.
Pilot 2: 100, Bill.
Pilot 1: Got 240. Copy that, Bill.
Ground: Yeah, I got it. Thank you.
Pilot 1: (10:40:50) We are going to be unable to hit that western one
the furthest to the north (3rd platoon, tank 7) . There's just
too much smoke obscuring it.
Ground: Okay.
Pilot 1: And I am in on that one tank I shot at last time (2nd platoon,
tank 2) . That beauty does not want to burn.
Ground: Roger.
***** (10:41:03 Pilot l's eleventh firing burst.)
Pilot 2: Okay, I'm up on the last tank (1st platoon, tank 6) east of
the real good smoker.
Ground: Roger.
Pilot 2: Well, I hit him.
Pilot 1: Okay, Bill, we will make one pass apiece, more. We have hit
every one of the tanks.
Ground: Understand, you think you hit them all. And you are going to
make one more pass.
Pilot 1: We have definitely hit them all. They're not all burning.
Ground : Okay
.
Pilot 2: (10:41:43) Yeah, we're getting some fires from the easternmost
(1st platoon) now.
Pilot 1: Yeah, there we go. That's what I just shot at. I will be in on
the command vehicle (tank 4) this time, Billy.
Ground: Roger that.
Pilot 1: If I can find it in the middle of that smoke I'm in.
Figure 7 is extracted from an in-flight recording of the pilots'
comments during the firing. The recording shows that the pilots were
faced with realistic battlefield obscuration, specifically smoke from
the fires and explosions within the tanks which they had catastrophically
damaged.
Figure 7. — TRANSCRIPT OF PILOTS' IN-FLIGHT VOICE
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77 95 NOTES : (a) Time, space, posi-
tion information
(b) Head-up display
Table V shows the burst length and number of rounds fired during each
pass. For aircraft PI, the average burst length was 1.17 seconds, which
was realistically short from the viewpoint of non-maneuvering exposure to
air defense fire. For the same aircraft, the average number of rounds
fired was 77, which was a moderate amount, but one which promised effec-
tive numbers of impacts on targets and perforations through the armored
envelope based on empirical ratios developed during testing in the LAVP.
For aircraft P2, similar comments can be made.
Table V. — THE RESULTS AIRCRAFT ATTACK, BURST LENGTHS
AND ROUNDS FIRED
A-25
TOTAL ROUNDS FIRED = 1969





































76 9 21 2














59 4 20 3
34 7 12 1
32 7 8 1
50 100 16
Table VI shows the arrival mode of the projectiles which impacted the
target tanks and the projectile effects in the cases where the projectiles
impacted armor. The table shows that 90% of the projectiles directly
impacted the target tanks while 10% arrived as ricochets off the ground.
The direct impacts in turn were broken down into 53% which directly im-
pacted the armor, and 47% which hit exterior components with varying but
largely insignificant results against the armor.























































































(a) TLna in minutea *f tar Paaa 01
(b) Company CoEcandar
Table VII shows the development of catastrophic damage in the tanks
of the target array in terms of the observed progress of internal fires
Tanks 11, 14, and 15, for example, were observed to burn, i.e., suffer
from major internal fires and/or explosions, within 5.6 minutes of the
initial firing pass.















































































































































































































































Ratios of Impacts to Rounds Fired:
Impacts _ 347 _ nip (includes impacts from






Rounds Fired 1969 direct impacts!
Lethality Related Measures
Ratios of Perforations to Impacts:
Perforations 50
n
, . (includes impacts from






Impacts 312 direct impacts)
*
The impacts include ricochets off ground (as noted) and also
impacts on secondary and incidental targets. Accuracy, then,
is firing situation accuracy and not aircraft/gun accuracy
per se.
Figure 11. A-10/GAU-8 MEASURES OF EFFEC-
TIVENESS IN COMBAT SIMULATION
OF 15 JUNE 7 8
A-30
A-10/GAU-8 Versus Simulated Soviet Tank Company
Ratios of Kills Per Pass
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Table X ties together aircraft attack parameters, weapon
effects, and target damage, in effect, summarizing the entire
firing test. The table shows that the pilots/planes/cannons
had the skill/performance/effects to immobilize the MBTs in
38% of the firing passes and catastrophically destroy them
in 26% of the passes.
Figure 12. A-10/GAU-8 VERSUS SIMULATED SOVIET TANK COMPANY
RATIOS OF KILLS PER PASS
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VI . Combat Damage Assessment
The CDAT functioned under the direction of a small Combat
Damage Assessment Committee which was responsible for assess-
ing the damage resulting from the attack, assigning kill fac-
tors, and publishing the overall report. The damage and kill
assessment was based on cumulative damage from all attacks.
Where possible, damage resulting from individual attacks was
assessed independently as part of the overall evaluation of
each target. Where the independent assessment of an individual
attack is made, the assessment is presented with the caveat
that when earlier attacks did not result in crew casualties
or seriously degrade mobility the time between attacks pro-
vided for a significant change in posture of individual tanks
on a dynamic battlefield with possible significant differences
in results.
Some targets were assessed as catastrophically destroyed
even though direct observation showed a delay between the
attack and the burning or explosion of the vehicle. Such an
assessment was made on the basis of evidence of simultaneous
crew casualties which made it highly improbably that the crew
would have any capability to resist the propagation of small
fires into killing fires and explosions.
The assessment of weapon effects and the assignment of
kill value is discussed belbw. Each target was examined
A-3 2
individually in an identical format which includes a descrip-
tion of the attack/passes; the number of impacts resulting
in perforations , significant damage, and insignificant damage;
and the rationale behind the overall assessment.
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Tank Target Damage Summary
M-47 Tank Number 2
1. Description of A-10 Attack on Tank 2 ; Within a period
of 6 minutes, tank 2 was primary target on 5 firing passes
and secondary target on 2 passes.
2. Kill Assessment : M-100%, F-95%, K-0, resulting from
the following impacts.
a. Perforations - 4
b. Significant Impacts - 16 (Contribute to M or F
kills) Damage to exterior M and F components.
c. Insignificant Impacts - 38 (Do not contribute to M
or F kill: effective maintenance procedures require repair or
replacement of damaged components.)
3
.
Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-100%: based on crew casualties from 4 perforations
and cumulative damage to exterior mobility components especially
the penetrated hub of right number 3 road wheel (Impact 42) and
the driver's periscope (Impact 30) (See Figs. 15 and 16)
b. F-95%: based on crew casualties from 4 perforations
and cumulative damage to exterior firepower components especially
the tank commander's and gunner's periscope heads (Impacts 11,
29) (See Figs. 13 and 14).
A-34
Figure 13 . — TARGET 2, IMPACT 11
Figure 14 . — TARGET 2, IMPACT 29
A-35
Figure 15. — TARGET 2, IMPACT 30
Figure 16. — TARGET 2, IMPACTS 41. AND 42
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Tank Target Damage Summary
M-4 7 Tank Number 4
1. Description of A-10 Attack on Tank 2 ; Within a period
of 7.6 minutes, tank 4 was primary target on 3 firing passes.
2. Kill Assessment : 70% M-Kill and 100% F-Kill resulting
from the following observed effects.
a. Perforations - 2
b. Significant Impacts - 8, which contribute to assess-
ment of M and F kills through resultant damage to exterior
M and F components.
c. Insignificant Impacts - 23, which do not contribute
to M and F kills. Effective maintenance procedures, however,
require repair or replacement of damaged components.
3
.
Rationale for Kill Assessment t
a. M-70% : based on cumulative damage to exterior mobility
components especially the penetrated right number 5 road wheel
hub (Impact 18) and cracked number 1 track support wheel hub
(Impact 28). (See Figs, 20 and 21).
b. F-70%: based on wounded L (Impact 5), damaged range-









— TARGET 4, IMPACT 5




— TARGET 4, IMPACT 12
Figure 20. — TARGET A, IMPACT 18
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Figure 21 . — TARGET 4, IMPACTS 28 AND 29
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Tank Target Damage Summary
M-4 7 Tank Number 5
1. Description of A-10 Attack on Tank 5 : Within a period of
8.6 minutes, tank 5 was impacted as primary target on 2 firing
passes and secondary target on 3 passes.
2. Kill Assessment ; K-Kill , resulting from the following im-
pacts .
a. Perforations - 9
b. Significant and Insignificant Damage resulted from
67 additional impacts, but all such damage was overridden in
importance by the catastrophic internal effects of the 9 per-
forations .
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment : Every one of the 4 perfora-
tions into the turret and 5 perforations into the hull could
have ignited either fuel or ammunition. By 10.3 minutes from
the time it was first fired on, tank 5 was observed burning.
Several minutes earlier the tank was observed smoking and the
CDAT concludes that a fuel (or oil) fire was ignited and rapidly
developed into catastrophic explosions of stowed ammunition and
ignition of fuel in main cells. The crew casualties assessed
from perforations 5, 6, 8, and 11 would have prevented the crew




Figure 22 . — TARGET 5, INTERIOR VIEW OF IMPACTS 5 AND 6
Figure 23 . — TARGET 5, IMPACT 8
A-42
Figure 24 . — TARGET 5, IMPACT 11
Figure 25. — TARGET 5, INTERIOR VIEW OF IMPACT 11
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Tank Target Damage Summary
M-47 Tank Number 6
1. Description of A-10 Attack on Tank 6 ; Within a period
of 8.4 minutes, tank 6 was impacted as primary target on 3
firing passes, secondary target on 2 passes, and incidental
target on 1
.
2. Kill Assessment : K-Kill resulting from the following
observed effects.
a. Perforations - 3
b. Significant and Insignificant Damage resulted from
29 additional impacts. All such damage, however, was over-
ridden in importance by the catastrophic internal effects of
the 3 perforations.
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment : Two perforations (10 and
33, see Figs. 27, 28) were achieved into the engine compart-
ment and both were capable of igniting fuel or oil in that
area. One additonal perforation (3, see Fig. 26) through the
TC ' s cupola had the capability of killing or wounding the
three crew members in the turret and igniting their clothing.
The tank was observed to be smoking 3,2 minutes after it had
been fired upon and the CDAT made the assessment that a fuel
or oil fire was propagated by the combined effects of perfora-
tions 3, 10, and 3 3, which caused the fire and prevented the




— TARGET 6, IMPACT 3
Figure 27 . — TARGET 6, IMPACT 10
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Figure 28 • — TARGET 6, IMPACT 33
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Tank Target Damage Summary
M-4 7 Tank Number 7
1. Description of A-10 Attack on Tank 7 : The target tank
was impacted as primary target on 1 firing pass from the right
side.
2. Kill Assessment ; 35% M-Kill resulting from the following
impacts
.
a. Perforations - 1
b. Significant and Insignificant Damage resulting from
11 additional impacts.
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment : One perforation was achieved
into the transmission compartment (impact 1, see Fig. 29).
Although the transmission was not damaged, the impact damaged
the right drive sprocket. Six additional hits (non-perforating
impacts) were scored (impacts 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 11), which
significantly damaged the track, road wheels, and track support
rollers of the target tank. The partial mobility kill was
assessed on the basis of the cumulative damage resulting from




Figure 29 . ~ TARGET 7, IMPACT 1
A- 4 8
Figure 30 . — TARGET 7, IMPACT 9
Figure 31 . — TARGET 7, IMPACT 10
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Tank Target Damage Summary
M-4 7 Tank Number 11
1. Description of A-10 Attack on Tank 11 ; Within a period
of 4.4. minutes, tank 11 was impacted as primary target on 2
firing passes, secondary target on 1 pass, and incidental
target on 2 passes all from the right side.
2
.
Kill Assessment ; K-Kill resulting from the following
observed effects.
a. Perforations - 7
b. Significant and Insignificant Damage resulting from
2 7 additional impacts. All such damage, however, was over-
ridden in importance by the catastrophic internal effects of
the 7 perforations.
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment: Three perforations (3, 4,
and 27; see Figs. 32, 33,. and 33 ) were achieved into the
fighting compartment, two of which had the capability of
causing crew casualties and/or igniting stowed ammunition.
Four perforations (12, 13, 18, and 23; see Figs. 34, 35,136,
and 37') were achieved into the engine compartment, one of which
penetrated into the right fuel tank. The CDAT assessed an
immediate K-Kill resulting largely from perforation 23 through
the right fuel tank, which in combination with the casualty-
producing perforations (impacts 3 and 4), other perforations,




Figure 32 . — TARGET 11, IMPACT 3
Figure 33 . — TARGET 11, INTERIOR VIEW OF IMPACT 4
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Figure 34 . — TARGET 11, IMPACT 12
Figure 35 „ — TARGET 11, IMPACT 13
A-52
Figure 36. — TARGET 11, IMPACT 18
•e 37. -~ TARGET 11,
A-53
Figure 38 . — TARGET 11, IMPACT 27
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Tank Target Damage Summary
M-4 7 Tank Number 12
1. Description of A-10 Attack on Tank 12 : Within a period
of 2.6 minutes, tank 12 was impacted as primary target on 2
passes, secondary target on 1 pass, and incidental target
on 2 passes all from the right side.
2. Kill Assessment : 100% M-Kill and 100% F-Kill resulting




b. Significant Impacts - 10, which contribute to
assessment of M and F kill through resultant damage to ex-
terior M and F components.
c. Insignificant Impacts - 15, which do not contribute
to M and F kill. Effective maintenance procedures, however,
require repair or replacement of damaged component.
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-100% based on perforations 5, 6, 7 and 27, which
killed or wounded all five crew members, perforation 15, which
damaged engine and transmission, and eight additional impacts,
especially numbers 17, 19, and 22, which significantly damaged
exterior mobility components.
b. F-100% : based on perforations 5, 6, 7, and 27, which
killed or wounded all five crew members, and impacts 20 and 23,
which jammed the turret making it impossible to traverse.
c. See Figs. 39,40 and 4 1 for photographs illustrating
the weapon effects and damage from impacts 7 (gunner casualty)
,
17 (road wheel hub penetrated) , and 20 (turret jammed)
.
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Figure 39. — TARGET 12, IMPACT 7
Figure 40. — TARGET 12, IMPACT 17
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Figure 41 '. — TARGET 12, IMPACT 20
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Tank Target Damage Summary
M-4 7 Tank Number 14
1. Description of A-10 Attack on Tank 14 ; Within a period
of 0.9 minutes, tank 14 was impacted as primary target on 1
firing pass and secondary target on 1 additional pass from the
right front and right side respectively. The tank was observed
to explode internally during the primary pass from the right
front.
2. Kill Assessment ; K-Kill resulting from the following
observed effects.
a. Perforations - 6
b. Significant and Insignificant Damage resulting from
8 additional impacts. All such damage , however, was overridden
in importance by the catastrophic effects of the 6 perforations.
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment : The CDAT assessed the damage
to tank 14 as an immediate catastrophic kill based on the ob-
served internal ammunition explosion during the first firing
pass against it. Perforation number 13, which had the location,
azimuth, and residual energy to contact and (ignite^ stowed







Figure 42 . — TARGET 14, IMPACT 13
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Tank Target Damage Summary
M-4 7 Tank Number 14
1. Description of A-10 Attack on Tank 14 : Within a period
of 0.9 minutes, tank 14 was impacted as primary target on 1
firing pass and secondary target on 1 additional pass from the
right front and right side respectively. The tank was observed





Kill Assessment : K-Kill resulting from the following
observed effects.
a. Perforations - 6
b. Significant and Insignificant Damage resulting from
8 additional impacts. All such damage, however, was overridden
in importance by the catastrophic effects of the 6 perforations.
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment ; The CDAT assessed the damage
to tank 14 as an immediate catastrophic kill based on the ob-
served internal ammunition explosion during the first firing
pass against it. Perforation number 13, which had the location,
azimuth, and residual energy to contact and (ignite^ stowed
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Figure 42 . — TARGET 14, IMPACT 13
A-59
Figure 43. — TARGET 14, INTERIOR VIEW OF IMPACT 13
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Tank Target Damage Summary
M-4 7 Tank Number 15
1. Description of A-10 Attack on Tank 15 ; This tank was
impacted as primary target on 1 firing pass. During the pass,
the attacking pilot fired 43 rounds in a 0.69-second burst
with 25 impacts on target.
2. Kill Assessment ; K-Kill resulting from the following
observed effects.
a. Perforations - 3
b. Significant and Insignificant Damage resulting from
22 additional impacts. All such damage, however, was over-
ridden in importance by the catastrophic effects of the 3 per-
forations
.
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment : Two projectiles (impacts
2, and 3) perforated the hull armor and penetrated into the
right fuel tank. One additional projectile (impact 11) perfo-
rated the hull armor at the right front of the fighting
compartment with high probability of resultant fragment/spall
wounds to one crew member (bow gunner) . The tank was observed
to be burning intensely approximately 2.5 minutes after the
firing pass. The CDAT assessed a K-Kill resulting from the
rapid propagation of a major fuel fire which could not be con-
trolled by the unwounded crew members (see Fig. 44 for impacts
2, 3 into fuel tank) .
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Figure 44 . — TARGET 15, IMPACTS 2 AND 3
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Tank Target Damage Summary
M-47 Tank Number 16
1. Description of A-10 Attack on Tank 16 : Within a period
8.6 minutes, tank 16 was impacted as primary target on 3
firing passes all from the right side.
2. Kill Assessment : K-Kill resulting from the following
observed effects.
a. Perforations - 8
b. Significant and Insignificant Damage resulting from
22 additional impacts. All such damage, however, was over-
ridden in importance by the catastrophic effects of the 8
perforations
.
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment ; Four projectiles (impacts
8, 10, 12, 13) perforated the right side of the turret with
high probability of causing casualties to tank commander,
gunner, and loader. Four projectiles (impacts 5, 7, 18, 20)
perforated the engine compartment armor with indeterminate
damage but probable ignition of fuel and/or oil in that area.
The target began to smoke immediately after the second firing
pass against it, and 2.6 minutes later, shortly after the third
firing pass, was observed to be burning. The CDAT assessed a
K-Kill resulting from the rapid propagation of a fuel fire
during and after the second firing pass, which could not be
controlled by the crew (see Figs. 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 for im-
pacts 8, 12, 18 and 20, as representative perforations of
turret and engine compartment)
.
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Figure 45 . — TARGET 16, IMPACT 8
,
:C^ ;-
Figure 46. — TARGET Lb, INTERIOR VIEW OF IMPACT 8
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Figure 47 . — TARGET 16, IMPACT 12
Figure 48 . — TARGET 16, INTERIOR VIEW OF IMPACT 12
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Figure 49 . — TARGET 16, IMPACTS 17 AND
18
Figure 50 . TARGET 16, IMPACTS 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, AND
24
A-66
VII. Summary and Conclusions
On 15 June 1978, at Nellis AFB , Nevada, the Combat Damage
Assessment Team (CDAT) conducted firings of the A-10/GAU-8 wea-
pon system against an array of 10 tanks simulating a Soviet
tank company deployed for an attack. The purpose of the firing
test was to evaluate the effects of the 30mm API antitank ammu-
nition of the GAU-8 gun under challenging conditions of engage-
ment for the A-10/GAU-8 system against realistically simulated
Soviet tank formations. The CDAT used M-4 7 tanks stowed with
main gun ammunition, diesel fuel, lubricating oil, and crew
mannikins to simulate the Soviet tanks. The pilots of the two
A-10 aircraft used in the firings conducted their attacks at
low altitudes and low dive angles which simulated attack below
the altitude of effective engagement for opposing air defense
systems using acquisition and fire control radar.
The firing test can be summarized in terms of the follow-
ing data which were collected and/or extracted from the firings
Aircraft Parameters
1. Speed (average) ---------- 316 knots
2. Dive Angle (average)- -------7.1°
3. Open Fire Slant Range (average) - - 2759 ft
4. Burst Length/Rounds (averages)- - - 1.3 sec/8 6 rds
5. Number Passes (primary) ------ 23
6. Target Aspects (predominantly)- - - Right Side
Weapon Effects Target Damage
1. Rounds Fired ----- 1969 1. K-Kills- - - - 6
2. Impacts- --- -- 347 2. Hi% M+F Kills- 3
3. Ricochets (off grnd) - 35 3. M Kill - - - - 1
4. Direct Hit (non-perf)- 262 4. F Kill - - - -
5. Perforation- ----- 50 5. Negligible - -
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These data and the more detailed base from which they were
extracted can be arranged into measures of effectiveness for
the A-10/GAU-8 system under conditions similar to those in the
firing test, i.e., empirical combat simulation. The following
values of effectiveness are based on the firing test on 15 June
1978 and can be expected to be similar in future empirical
simulations of combat:
Measures of Effectiveness





Rounds Fired Direct Impacts
Weapon System Weapon System
Effectiveness Ratio : Effectiveness Ratio :
Tank Immobilized n oft Tanks K-Killed ~ ,
=r = 0.39 = = 0.26Passes Passes
The ten target tanks were attacked predominately from the
right side and suffered the severe damage shown in Figure 1 and
Table VIII. Seven of the tanks, however, were impacted more
than once as primary targets, and all of the tanks were also
secondary and/or incidental targets during passes directed
primarily against neighboring tanks. The large number of pri-
mary passes and accompanying secondary and incidental impacts
help to explain the severe damage to the tank and contrasting
moderate ratios of damage and kills per pass.
The data and measures summarized above, and the other data
contained in this report, support several conclusions:
1. The A-10/GAU-8 system in realistic simulation of
A-68
combat is capable of inflicting K, M and F Kills on M-47 and
similarly protected main battle tanks, e.g., Soviet T-55 and
T-62 tanks.
2. The system in low level attacks can perforate spe-
cifically the side and rear surfaces of the hulls and turrets
of M-47 and similarly protected main battle tanks.
3. The system is an effective killing agent against the
side and rear surfaces of M-47 and similar tanks when firing
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